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We propose a scheme of quantum secret sharing between Alices’ group and Bobs’ group with
single photons and unitary transformations. In the protocol, one member in Alices’ group prepares
a sequence of single photons in one of four different states, while other members directly encode
their information on the sequence of single photons via unitary operations, after that the last
member sends the sequence of single photons to Bobs’ group. Then Bobs except for the last one
do work similarly. Finally last member in Bobs’ group measures the qubits. If Alices and Bobs
guarnnted the security of quantum channel by some tests, then the qubit states sent by last member
of Alices’ group can be used as key bits for secret sharing. It is shown that this scheme is safe.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution is
a remarkable application of quantum information. It has
attracted widespread attention since the seminal work on
quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard [1]
and Ekert [2]. So far there are many quantum key distri-
bution theoretical protocols [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Some of them were demon-
strated in the laboratory and will be used in the future
secret communications. With quantum mechanics, other
cryptographic tasks can be realized, such as quantum se-
cure direct communication [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36] and quantum secret
sharing (QSS) [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57].
Assume that there are a manager Alice, and her agents
Bob and Charlie, who are at remote places. One of the
agents, Bob or Charlie, is not entirely trusted by Alice,
and unfortunately she does not know who is the honest
one. However Alice knows that if Bob and Charlie co-
operate, the honest one will keep the dishonest one from
doing anything wrong. By means of the secret sharing
Alice can instruct Bob and Charlie to complete a task
safely. The idea of secret sharing is that a secret of Alice,
is shared between her agents, Bob and Charlie, in such a
way that it can only be reconstructed if both collaborate.
However, as a matter of fact, there is not any classical
mean to establish a secret sharing between Alice and two
distant agents Bob and Charlie. Amazingly, the principle
of quantum mechanics has now provided the foundation
stone to QSS referring to the implementation of the se-
cret sharing task. The first QSS protocol of quantum se-
cret sharing [37] was put forward by Hillery, Buzˇek and
Berthiaume using entangled three-photon Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states. Xiao et al [38] reformu-
lated the protocol [37] into arbitrary number party case.
Karlsson et al [39] realized secret sharing as in Ref. [37]
with two-particle quantum entanglement. They also dis-
cussed how to detect eavesdropping, or how to detect a
dishonest party in the protocols. Furthermore, the con-
cept of quantum sharing of classical secrets has also been
generalized to the sharing of secret quantum information,
which is often called quantum state sharing [48, 49]. In
a more general case, notably for secure key management,
a t-out-of -n protocol (or (t, n)-threshold scheme) with
1 ≤ t ≤ n spreads a secret to n participants in a way
that any t participants can reconstruct it [50]. Recently,
Lance et al reported an experimental demonstration of a
(2,3) threshold QSS protocol [51].
Most of the existing QSS protocols use entangled states
[37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. However it is be-
lieved that implementing such multiparty secret sharing
tasks is not always so easy, as the efficiency of preparing
entangled states is very low [58, 59], at the same time
the efficiency of the existing QSS protocols using quan-
tum entanglement can only approach 50%. Recently, a
scheme for quantum secret sharing without entanglement
has been proposed by Guo and Guo [52]. They presented
an idea to directly encode the qubit of quantum key dis-
tribution and accomplish one splitting a message into
many parts to achieve one-to-multiparty secret sharing
only by product states. The theoretical efficiency is dou-
bled to approach 100%. Deng et al also presented a one-
to-multiparty secret sharing by using single photons [53].
Zhang et al proposed an QSS protocol by using single
photons and unitary transformations [54, 55, 56].
Signatures on documents, authentications, encryp-
tions, and decryptions are often needed by more than
one person, especially by all persons of two groups in a
trade. Therefore, it is needed to share a secret between
many parties and many parties. That is, it is required the
secret message shared by two groups, in such a way that
neither any subset of each group nor the union of a subset
of group 1 and a subset of group 2 can extract the secret
message, but the entire group 1 or group 2 can. More
2recently, we proposed a quantum secret sharing scheme
employing two conjugate bases, i.e. four states, of single
qubits to achieve the secret sharing between multiparty
and multiparty with a sequence of single photons [57].
The weakness of our protocol was pointed out by Deng
et al [60] and Li et al [61], they also gave a little modifica-
tion to avoid the flaw. We have avoided the flaw pointed
out in Ref. [61] with a little improvement of our proto-
col [62]. Another QSS protocol between multiparty and
multiparty using three rather than two conjugate bases
was suggested by us [63].
In present Letter, we will combine the protocol of
Zhang’s in Ref. [54] and ours [57, 62] to figure out a
scheme of quantum secret sharing between multiparty
and multiparty with single photons and unitary trans-
formations. The security of this protocol is discussed.
Let us suppose that group 1 and group 2 are located
in different places, and there are members Alice 1, Alice
2, · · · , Alice m, and Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n in group
1, and group 2 respectively. Here m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
Group 1 and group 2 want quantum secret sharing such
that neither part of each group nor the combination of
a part of group 1 and a part of group 2 knows the key,
but only all members of each group can collaborate to
determine what the string (key) is. A protocol employing
two conjugate bases going as follows will meet the goal
of quantum secret sharing.
M1. Alice 1 generates two random classical bit strings
A1 = {a11, a12, · · · , a1N} and B1 = {b11, b12, · · · , b1N}, where
a1k and b
1
k are uniformly taken from {0, 1}. Based on
these two strings A1 and B1 she then makes a block of
N qubits (single photons),
|Ψ1〉 = ⊗Nk=1|ψa1
k
b1
k
〉, (1)
where a1k is the kth bit of A1 (and similar for B1), each
qubit |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 is in one of the four states
|ψ00〉 = |0〉, (2)
|ψ10〉 = |1〉, (3)
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, (4)
|ψ11〉 = |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (5)
The basis is determined by the value of b1k. If b
1
k is 0 then
a1k is encoded in the Z basis |0〉, |1〉; if b1k is 1 then a1k is
encoded in the X basis |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
. As
the four states are not all mutually orthogonal, so there
is no measurement which can distinguish between all of
them with certainty. Alice 1 then delivers |Ψ1〉 to Alice
2 over their public quantum communication channel.
M2. When Alice i (i = 2, 3, · · · ,m) receives N signals
delivered by Alice i− 1 she use a special filter to prevent
the invisible photons from entering the operation system
[56, 65]. Then she chooses randomly a sufficiently enough
subset of photons as the samples for eavesdropping check.
First, let sample photon signals go to a photon number
splitter (PNS: 50/50), and then measures each signal in
the measurement basis (MB) Z, or X choosing randomly
[60]. Evidently if more than two photons in one signal
are measured, then Alice i will abort the communication.
Moreover, she analyzes the error rate εs of the samples
by means that she requires Alice 1, Alice 2, . . ., Alice
i − 1 to tell her the original states of the samples and
the operations implemented by them. If the error rate
is reasonably lower than the threshold εt, Alice i goes
ahead, otherwise she aborts it.
M3. Alice i (i = 2, 3, · · · ,m) generates a quater-
nary string Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · , aiN} and a binary string
Bi = {bi1, bi2, · · · , biN}, where aik and bik are uniformly
chosen from {0, 1, 2, 3} and {0, 1}, respectively. For each
|ψai−1
k
b
i−1
k
〉 of the N qubit state |Ψi−1〉 = ⊗Ni=1|ψai−1
k
b
i−1
k
〉,
she implements the operation σ0, σ1, σ2 or σ3 on it de-
pending on the corresponding aik of Ai is 0, 1, 2 or 3,
respectively. At the same time she operates the qubit
with I or a Hadamard operator H according to the bit
bik in Bi is 0 or 1, respectively. Here
σ0 = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
σ1 = iσy = −|1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|,
σ2 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|,
σ3 = σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
H =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|+ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)〈1|. (6)
These unitary operations made by Alice i are equal to the
encryption on the states of single photons. The resulting
state of this qubit is denoted by |ψai
k
bi
k
〉.
M4. Alice i sends the photons (N qubit state |Ψi〉 =
⊗Nk=1|ψai
k
bi
k
〉) to Alice i + 1 (i = 2, 3, · · · ,m − 1). Alice
m sends N -qubit state |Ψm〉 = ⊗Nk=1|ψamk bmk 〉 to Bob 1.
M5. When Bob j (j = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1) has received
string ofN qubits, he does work similarly. First he makes
eavesdropping check using the method Alice i used. If the
error rate of the samples is higher than a threshold then
he aborts the quantum communication. Otherwise he
creates a quaternary string Cj = {cj1, cj2, · · · , cjN} and a
binary string Dj = {dj1, dj2, · · · , djN}. Depending on the
values of cjk and d
j
k he makes operations on the qubits
just like Alice i does. That is, he applies the operation
σ0, σ1, σ2 or σ3 on it depending on the corresponding
c
j
k of Cj is 0, 1, 2 or 3, respectively; and he implements
the operation I or a Hadamard operator H on the qubit
according to the bit djk in Dj is 0 or 1, respectively.
M6. Bob n first randomly and independently chooses
sufficient samples to make measurement in MB Z, or X
randomly. Then he asks Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice m,
and Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n − 1 to announce publicly
the ais, b
i
s, c
j
s, d
j
s of the samples in a random sequential
order. After that he checks the error rate of the sam-
ples measured in the MB Z or X according to the XOR
results of the corresponding sample bits in the strings
B1, B2, . . . , Bm, D1, D2, · · · , Dn−1. If the error rate is
3higher than the threshold εt, Bob n aborts it, otherwise
they go to the next step.
M7. All members in group 1 and group 2 publicly an-
nounce the stringsB1, B2, . . . , Bm andD1, D2, . . . , Dn−1.
Bob n measures each of their qubits with the MB Z or X
according to the XOR (i.e.,⊕) results of the correspond-
ing bits in the strings B1, B2, . . . , Bm, D1, D2, . . . , Dn−1.
M8. Two groups make the error rate analysis of the
transmission between the two groups. To this end, it
requires that all Alices and all Bobs publicly announce ais
and the measurement results of the sample qubits chosen
randomly, and analyze the error rates of the samples.
If the channel is secure, the qubit states sent by Alice
m can be used as key bits for secret sharing, otherwise
they discard the results obtained and retry the quantum
communication from the beginning.
Now we discuss the security of this quantum secret
sharing protocol between m parties and n parties with
single photons and unitary transformations. Obviously,
the test in M2 and M5 can nullify the attack with invis-
ible photons [65] and the Trojan horse attack [60]. The
checking procedure in M5 can avoid the attack with single
photons and attack with EPR pairs [62]. The fake-signal
attack with EPR pairs can be detected by the operations
in M3 and the check in M2 and M5 [62]. So we can
believe the security of the protocol without question.
We should point out that the above protocol can be
generalized to the situation where three conjugate bases,
or six states are employed [63].
In summary, we propose a scheme for quantum
secret sharing between multi-party and multi-party with
single photons and unitary transformations, where no
entanglement is employed. In the protocol, Alice 1
prepares a sequence of single photons in one of four
different states according to her two random classical
strings, other Alice i (2 ≤ i ≤ m) directly encodes
her information strings on the resulting sequence of
Alice (i − 1) via unitary operations, after that Alice m
sends the sequence of single photons to Bob 1. Bob l
(l = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1) does work similar to Alice i. Finally
Bob n measures the qubits. If Alices and Bobs guarantee
the security of quantum channel by some tests, then the
qubit states sent by Alice m can be used as key bits
for secret sharing. Any subset of all Alices or all Bobs
can not extract secret information, but the entire set
of all Alices and the entire set of all Bobs can. It is
shown that this scheme is in safety. As entanglement,
especially the inaccessible multi-party entangled state,
is not necessary in the present quantum secret sharing
protocol between m-party and n-party, it may be more
applicable when the numbers m and n of the parties of
secret sharing are large. This protocol is feasible with
present-day technique.
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